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RECENT DECISIONS
tionary power of equity to vacate judgments obtained by fraud should not
be hampered by a rule of apparently little value, but rather should be
exercised freely to obtain substantial justice in each particiular case.
WI.LIAIv X. HAAsE
CRIINAL LAW - IISTAKE OF LAW- RELIANCE
UPON ADVICE OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL
A Maryland statute provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
to construct, erect or maintain... signs, or display advertising of any kind
whatsover,... any one or more of which is intended to aid in the solicitation
or performance of marriages.' 1 The defendant, a minister who conducted
what the court called a "marriage business," consulted the State's Attorney
about the legality of erecting in front of his home a sign identifying the
defendant as a minister. The State's Attorney advised the defendant that
erection of the sign would not constitute a violation of the statute. Relying
on this advice, the defendant erected the sign. He was then indicted for a
violation of the statute. At the trial he attempted to introduce in evidence
the advice of the State's Attorney, but the court refused to allow this evi-
dence. From a conviction, the defendant appealed. Though the judgment
was reversed on other grounds, the court took the position that reliance
upon the erroneous advice of the public official constituted a mistake of
law and could not be shown as a defense in a criminal prosecution.2
The principal of the common law that there can be no crime without
a criminal mind3 governs only so far as the public welfare and policy permit
or demand.4 Thus, generally, neither ignorance of the law nor mistake
of law is allowed as a legal defense,; although if the crime charged involves
(perjured testimony concerning true physical condition of claimant held extrinsic
fraud where claimant feigned injury) with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins 91
F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1937) (perjured testimony concerning true physical condition
of claimant held not to constitute extrinsic fraud where claimant actually sustained
minor injuries, the nature and extent of which were in issue in the prior proceeding).
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 444A (Flack Supp. 1947). The constitutionality-of
this statute was upheld in State v. Clay, 182 Md. 639, 35 A.2d 821 (1944).
'Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456 (Md. 1949). Lambert v. State, 69 A.2d (Md.
1949), decided the same day, relied on the authority of the principal case.
' "The doctrine of intent, as it prevails in the criminal law, is necessarily one of the
foundation principles of public justice. There is only one criterion by which the
guilt of men is to be tested. It is whether the mind is criminal." BISHOP, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 287 (5th ed. 1872).
"HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 49 (1881).
"4 BL. COMMENTARIES *27. For an exhaustive history of the rule that ignorance
of the law is not an excuse, see Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law,
22 HARv. L. REv. 75 (1908). Another exception to the requirement of the crimi-
nal mind is constituted by those statutory crimes which require no intent whatso-
ever. That this latter exception is also based on grounds of public policy, see Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 56 (1933).
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no moral turpitude, both would tend to show the absence of a criminal
mind. However, if a specific intent is required to constitute the crime
charged, ignorance or mistake of law may be shown to prove the absence
of the requisite intent.6
It would seem that if the defendant in good faith seeks the advice of a
public official empowered by virtue of his office to give such advice, makes
a full disclosure of the facts, and acts reasonably and in good faith upon the
advice given, he should be protected if the advice proves erroneous.7  It
would seem that this protection should even extend to a defendant who
acts upon advice obtained from an official who in fact is not empowered to
give the advice which the defendant sought, as long as the official is ap-
parently invested with such power, and as long as his position bears a
reasonably close connection with the subject matter of the advice given s
The objection applicable to permitting ignorance of the law to operate as
a defense -that the ignorance may be proved only subjectively by refer-
ence to the accused's state of mind9 - is not fully applicable here, since the
basis for the mistake - the official's advice - may be proved objectively,
without reference to the accused's state of mind. The difficulty of proof
would be no greater than that involved in proving mistake of fact, which
does operate as a defense.10 The majority of courts, however, have not
'U.S. v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 Sup. Ct. 223 (1933); Taylor v. State, 107 Ind.
483 (1886). Ignorance or mistake of law has been held to constitute a defense
where the statute is obscure, or is capable of more than one reasonable construction.
Cutter v. State, 36 N.J.L. 125 (1873); Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 61
S.W.2d 512 (1933). However, this result seems unsound, for if a criminal statute
is truly obscure or indefinite, it should be held unconstitutional. If it is not obscure
or indefinite, the square problem is presented whether ignorance or mistake of law
should operate as a defense to a prosecution under the statute.
'It has been suggested that reliance on the erroneous advice of counsel should also
operate as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in
the Criminal Law, 88 UNIV. OF PA. L. REv. 42 (1939). But the reasons for allow-
ing the defense in the case of advice by a public official are more compelling be-
cause confidence in the government is destroyed when citizens are punished for re-
lying on the advice of public officers who are apparently authorized to give such
advice. See Perkins, supra, at 43.
'Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 UNIv. OF CHm. L. REv. 641,
675-76 (1941). If the official's position has no connection with the subject matter
of the advice it cannot be said that the accused acted reasonably on such advice.
State v. Simmons, 143 N.C. 613, 56 S.E. 701 (1907) (defendant relied on the
advice of a court clerk that defendant had authority to carry a weapon); Jones v.
State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 533, 25 S.W. 124 (1894) (defendant relied on the advice
of the mayor that he could sell liquor on election day).
'People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892).
10 "As a general rule it is stated that a mistake of fact will disprove a criminal charge"
if the mistaken belief is (a) honestly entertained, (b) of such a nature that the con-
duct would have been lawful had the facts been as they were reasonably supposed
to be." Perkins, supra note 7, at 54. Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875). But
where intent is not a necessary element of the crime charged, the defense of ignorance
[Jue
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recognized mistake of law induced by a public official's advice as a defense.1
The result has been sharply criticized 2 and some courts have permitted the
defense.13
Measures sometimes recommended or resorted to by courts for the pro-
tection of defendants denied the defense 4 - executive clemency or the im-
posing of a nominal fine only -are not equivalent to exoneration. Nor
does the possibility of a declaratory judgment afford sufficient protection,
for the remedy is not always available,'8 and even if available, the time and
or mistake of fact will not be available. Haynes v. State, 118 Tenn. 709, 105 S.W.
251 (1907). Contra: Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456 (1877).
'The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451 (U.S. 1874) (ambassador); Hoover v. State, 59 Ala.
57 (1877) (probate judge); Broadfoot v. State, 28 Ala. App. 261, 182 So. 411
(1938) (opinions of attorney general); Lindquist v. State, 213 Ark. 903, 213
S.W.2d 895 (1948) (opinions of attorney general); State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521,
36 Ad. 1000 (1897) (fish commissioner); State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30 (1876)
(magistrate); Staley v. State, 89 Neb. 701, 131 N.W. 1028 (1911) (county at-
torney); Pisar v. State, 56 Neb. 455, 76 N.W. 869 (1898) (license board);
Hamilton v. People, 57 Barbour 625 (N.Y. 1870) (governor); State v. Simmons,
143 N.C. 613, 56 S.E. 701 (1907) (court clerk); State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163,
46 Ad. 833 (1900) (state treasurer); Jones v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 533, 25 S.W.
124 (1894) (mayor). The same result has been reached where the reliance was
on the advice of counsel. People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 Pac. 436
(1923); Needham v. State, 55 Okla. Cr. R. 430, 32 P.2d 92 (1934); State v.
Whitaker, 118 Ore. 656, 247 Pac. 1077 (1926); Commonwealth v. Hargreaves,
50 Pa. D. & C. 641 (1944); Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 128 S.W. 361 (1928).
For an excellent decision to the effect that good faith reliance on the advice of
counsel is a defense, see Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1949).
' Hall and Seligman, supra note 8, at 675. See also Von Hentig, The Doctrine of
Mistake, A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 16 UNIv. oF KAN. Cin L. Rnv.
17, 31 (1949).
'People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 695 (1933) (corporation com-
mission); State v. White, 237 Mo. 208, 140 S.W. 896 (1911) (election judges);
State v. Pearson, 97 N.C. 434, 1 S.E. 914 (1887) (election commission). Re-
liance on the decision of the state supreme court, either construing or determining
the validity of a statute, has been held to constitute a good defense. State v. O'Neil,
147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902
(1915); accord, Wilson v. Goodlin, 291 Ky. 144, 163 S.W.2d 309 (1942) (re-
liance on decision of circuit court, where superior court had not rendered a decision).
'4Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57, 60 (1877) (court denied defense but suggested that
the case was one for executive clemency); Lindquist v. State, 213 Ark. 903, 904, 213
S.W.2d 895 (1948) (appellate court approved of trial court's action in denying
defense but imposing only nominal fine).
' "The circumstances should entitle a defendant to a full exoneration as a matter of
right, rather than to something less, as a matter of grace." Long v. State, 65 A.2d
489, 498 (Del. 1949).
" The failure to obtain the state's consent in an action against it for a declaratory
judgment may prevent such a proceeding. Purity Oats Co. v. State, 125 Kan. 558,
264 Pac. 740 (1928). Or, the court may find an absence of a justiciable contro-
versy. Adam v. Walla Walla, 196 Wash. 268, 82 P.2d 584 (1938). But see
Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 726, 291 N.W. 62, 64 (1940): "Plaintiffs seek-
ing a declaratory judgment, are not required in advance to violate a penal statute
19501
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expense involved in obtaining a determination may in many cases render
the remedy impractical.
In the principal case, had the court allowed evidence of the advice of
the State's Attorney to be admitted, it could have been found that the
defendant acted reasonably in relying on the official's advice, for the offi-
cial was at least apparently empowered to give such advice and the statute
did not expressly prohibit the erection of a sign which simply identified the
defendant as being a minister. Therefore, the court should have submitted
to the jury the questions of whether the defendant made a full disclosure of
facts to the official, acted in good faith, and in fact did rely reasonably on
the official's advice.
G. VERNON OWEN, JR.
as a condition of having it construed or its validity determined." See generally
BORCHARD, DEcLARAToRY JUDGMENTS 1020 et seq. (2d ed. 1941).
